[dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG
bert hubert <bert.hubert@netherlabs.nl> Wed, 04 January 2012 20:27 UTC
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From: bert hubert <bert.hubert@netherlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2012 21:26:44 +0100
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Subject: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG
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Hi everybody, As part of a recent very big PowerDNS deployment as a DNSSEC signer, we've encountered an interesting issue. I'm sharing this here in hopes of hearing your wisdom, plus possibly to warn you about this happening in your code or deployments too. In a zone there are three MX RRs for a name, of which 2 are identical. PowerDNS signs all three records in canonical order when the zone is transferred to BIND (at least I think it is BIND). That server subsequently drops one of the two identical records, and serves only two MX RRs to the world, BUT with the RRSIG that was calculated from all three records. Bad data ensues, and bounced emails, since this is in the country that actually validates. Now, there are at least 3 places where we might call 'bug': 1) the process that put duplicate RRs in the database 2) PowerDNS for signing the 3 RRs or 3) the 'outer' server for silently dropping one of the RRs, in the assumption that the RRSIG will survice this process. RFC 2181, section 5, says that servers should (lower case) 'suppress' duplicate RRSIGs, which would argue that at least PowerDNS is partially to blame, and should've dropped the duplicate record. However, the outer server I think should also not feel free to drop records on an DNSSEC signed zone. What do you think? Bert
- [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG bert hubert
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG Mohan Parthasarathy
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG bmanning
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG bert hubert
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG Doug Barton
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG SM
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG Marco Davids (SIDN)
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG Tony Finch
- Re: [dnsext] duplicate RRs and resulting RRSIG Tony Finch