Re: How do we get the whole world to upgrade to DNSSEC capable resolvers?

"David W. Hankins" <David_Hankins@isc.org> Wed, 13 August 2008 16:44 UTC

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Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 09:39:36 -0700
From: "David W. Hankins" <David_Hankins@isc.org>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: How do we get the whole world to upgrade to DNSSEC capable resolvers?
Message-ID: <20080813163936.GA18651@isc.org>
References: <B5457C05-D2EA-4A31-94AB-84807AC62843@virtualized.org> <Pine.LNX.4.44.0808121535120.3680-100000@citation2.av8.net> <OF6BFCDCCD.B3B7FD05-ON802574A4.004C3FB5-802574A4.004C6A52@nominet.org.uk> <764E89A0-32D2-4555-B61C-C8B7D88EB9E1@ca.afilias.info>
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 11:52:14AM -0400, Joe Abley wrote:
> On 13 Aug 2008, at 09:54, Ray.Bellis@nominet.org.uk wrote:
>>> But it is not the case that your bank information can be stolen by this
>>> DNS attack, as Kaminsky seems to have told the mainstream press.
>>
>> Unless your bank used a weak cert generated on a Debian system...
>
> Or unless the authentication performed by the CA is easily subverted, 
> leading them to sell a certificate with a to-be-spoofed common name to a 
> third party.

Or even Kaminsky-subverting http://www.bank.com/ to point to a host
which produces a redirect to https://www.bankfoo.com/, which is under
the attacker's full control.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?	 https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. Hankins	"If you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer		     you'll just have to do it again."
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.		-- Jack T. Hankins

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