Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one week
Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net> Tue, 23 September 2008 07:33 UTC
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Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2008 03:23:48 -0400
To: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
From: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one week
Cc: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@commandprompt.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <200809230618.m8N6IXIU074687@drugs.dv.isc.org>
References: <Your message of "Tue, 23 Sep 2008 00:37:21 -0400." <E1Khzea-000Bob-2Y@psg.com> <200809230618.m8N6IXIU074687@drugs.dv.isc.org>
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At 02:18 AM 9/23/2008, Mark Andrews wrote: > No, it is NOT unkown. It is insecure. You are attempting to introduce > a state which does not exist. > > secure -> passes validation > insecure -> no TA or there is a insecure delegation from a secure zone. > bogus -> fails validation From 4035... Secure: An RRset for which the resolver is able to build a chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from a trusted security anchor to the RRset. In this case, the RRset should be signed and is subject to signature validation, as described above. Insecure: An RRset for which the resolver knows that it has no chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from any trusted starting point to the RRset. This can occur when the target RRset lies in an unsigned zone or in a descendent of an unsigned zone. In this case, the RRset may or may not be signed, but the resolver will not be able to verify the signature. Arends, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 4035 DNSSEC Protocol Modifications March 2005 Bogus: An RRset for which the resolver believes that it ought to be able to establish a chain of trust but for which it is unable to do so, either due to signatures that for some reason fail to validate or due to missing data that the relevant DNSSEC RRs indicate should be present. This case may indicate an attack but may also indicate a configuration error or some form of data corruption. Indeterminate: An RRset for which the resolver is not able to determine whether the RRset should be signed, as the resolver is not able to obtain the necessary DNSSEC RRs. This can occur when the security-aware resolver is not able to contact security-aware name servers for the relevant zones.
- [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one week Andrew Sullivan
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Scott Rose
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC (Was: [dnsext] Remind… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- [dnsext] Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC Wes Hardaker
- Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC (Was: [dnsext] Re… Edward Lewis
- [dnsext] recommeded contents for Re: DNAME (and C… Edward Lewis
- [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DNAME/… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] recommeded contents for Re: DNAME (a… Scott Rose
- [dnsext] Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC Wes Hardaker
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… John Dickinson
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Florian Weimer
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Florian Weimer
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Edward Lewis
- the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closin… Edward Lewis
- Re: the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC cl… bmanning
- Re: the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC cl… David Conrad
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Wouter Wijngaards
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Alex Bligh
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure a… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Shane Kerr
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Alex Bligh
- Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-floppin… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Alex Bligh
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Edward Lewis
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Mark Andrews
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Wouter Wijngaards
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Mark Andrews
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis