[dnsext] [Errata Verified] RFC5702 (7090)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 26 August 2022 19:34 UTC

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Subject: [dnsext] [Errata Verified] RFC5702 (7090)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC5702,
"Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC". 

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You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7090

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Status: Verified
Type: Technical

Reported by: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>
Date Reported: 2022-08-15
Verified by: Warren Kumari (Ops AD) (IESG)

Section: 8.2

Original Text
-------------
8.2.  Signature Type Downgrade Attacks

   Since each RRSet MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the
   DNSKEY RRSet at the zone apex (see Section 2.2 of [RFC4035]), a
   malicious party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG and force the
   validator to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the
   zone.  This should provide resilience against algorithm downgrade
   attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2.

Corrected Text
--------------
[none]

Notes
-----
The section is incorrect in its entirety. Although the requirement on signers does exist, there is no related requirement for validators to check that all signature algorithms are present. RFC6840 5.11 (which I do realise is newer than RFC5702) re-states this explicitly, where RFC4035 merely implied this distinction.


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RFC5702 (draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-14)
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Title               : Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC
Publication Date    : October 2009
Author(s)           : J. Jansen
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : DNS Extensions
Area                : Internet
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG