[dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications
Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> Mon, 28 March 2011 08:10 UTC
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Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2011 04:12:10 -0400
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications
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Dear colleagues, The following is a result of a side conversation on the interpretation of RFC403x with number of DNS colleagues. Any mistakes in the questions are mine. The questions are: 1) What is the valid order of signed RRsets? 2) How many times SHOULD/MUST RRSIG(SOA) appear in an AXFR? 3) What RRSIG(SOA)'s MUST appear on the wire in an IXFR transaction? Q1) A: In RFC403x there is no order requirement on an signed RRset thus implementations should be ready to handle any combination Following Examples should be treated as the same RRset RR1 RR3 RRSIG2 RR2 RRSIG1 RR2 RR3 RR1 RR3 RRSIG1 RR2 RRSIG1 RRSIG2 RRSIG2 RR1 Q2) In AXFR the SOA record is used as a marker record to signal the beginning of a zone transfer and the end of the zone transfer. The open question is how many times should RRSIG(SOA) appear in the AXFR stream ? a) Only once b) Both times c) Does not matter both are ok. if the answer is a) then the question is when should it appear, i) in the beginning after the SOA ii) at any time in the AXFR iii) just before the final one. iv) after the final one. Q3) In IXFR there are multiple SOA records used as maker both on the overall transaction and on each delta. The questions here are: Which RRSIG(SOA) i.e. for each serial number, are needed ? a) All of them once b) all of them each time SOA appears b) only the final one, all the other ones are immaterial (open question is how often and where) c) The first and last one and each only once, the first one is needed to identify what to delete from the zone, the final one is what is going to be in the zone after the IXFR is applied. Is there need put this information in dnssec-bis (the answer to the AXFR question may update RFC5936) and in IXFR-bis document ? Olafur
- [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Masataka Ohta
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications George Barwood
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Marc Lampo
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Antoin Verschuren
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Joe Abley
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Joe Abley
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Marc Lampo
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Joe Abley
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Michael Graff
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Marc Lampo
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Michael Graff
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Joe Abley
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Marc Lampo
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Miek Gieben
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications Michael Graff