Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules

Jelte Jansen <jelte@isc.org> Sun, 21 November 2010 10:34 UTC

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Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2010 11:35:08 +0100
From: Jelte Jansen <jelte@isc.org>
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To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com> <4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz> <20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com> <20101119060416.024456F87CD@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org> <20101119131627.E8B616F8F8B@drugs.dv.isc.org>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 11/19/2010 02:16 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
>>> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
>>> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
>>> not trusted out of the validator.
>>>
>>
>> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
>> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
>> insecure, during the roll
>>
> 
> No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
> behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.
> 
> During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
> a supported algorithm.
>  

no, but during the DS switch there would be, same problem, just a different level.

If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either have to
have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully signed
with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the zone itself
signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only support the other
algorithm.

But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publish
rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)

The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and not
the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.

Jelte

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