Re: [dnsext] historal root keys for upgrade path?

Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> Mon, 31 January 2011 19:33 UTC

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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 11:36:35 -0800
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] historal root keys for upgrade path?
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On Jan 31, 2011, at 11:32 AM, Brian Dickson wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 3:23 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Brian Dickson
>> <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>>> The simplest bootstrap method would be to have a series of BSK
>>> (bootstrap keys), created on a periodic basis (every N years), and
>>> used as follows:
>> 
>> If a compromise has occurred then the first thing to ask would be why.
>> There are only three places where a compromise can logically occur - in the
>> cryptographic algorithm, in the cryptographic hardware manufacturer or in
>> ICANN,
> 
> No, there is a fourth place: brute force attack on the key/signature,
> to find the key.
> 
> The brute force success on one key, compromises that key only, plus
> any data signed by it or derived therefrom.

NO THERE IS NOT!

Repeat after me:

"If you are in even the remotest danger of a brute force attack by anything less than a cubic-earth of sci-fi nanotech, you need to use a larger key."

Cryptographic attacks may happen, which if it makes it possible to brute-force one key implies that the cryptosystem itself has broken.  

Brute force alone, outside the context of a cryptographic attack, WILL NOT HAPPEN.