Re: [DNSOP] Special-use TLDs in resolvers

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Fri, 16 August 2019 13:31 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 09:30:58 -0400
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Special-use TLDs in resolvers
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On Aug 16, 2019, at 09:26, Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz> wrote:
> 
> On 8/16/19 3:10 PM, Ted Lemon wrote:
>> If you look up “onion”, you have revealed that the user is trying to
>> use tOR, even if you haven’t revealed where they are going.
> 
> Well, in this particular case the tOR client would probably better not
> send onion queries to DNS resolver, but generally there would be a leak,
> though the TTL is a whole day.  At least unless combined with one of the
> "local root" schemes (which are so far not commonly deployed, I think).

It could leak accidentally if the URL gets sent to the wrong browser. 

>> What’s the motivation behind this proposal?
> 
> As I wrote, supplying the answer with a DNSSEC proof seems better to
> me.  And it makes my camel a tiny bit happier, I guess :-)  At that
> moment I didn't realize that if you forward to a resolver that does
> respect that SHOULD, you will not be able to obtain the proof in this
> way and consequently regress, so the change would be double-edged in
> this respect.

There is no need for DNSSEC proof of the nonexistence of these zones. They are nonexistent by postulate, not by theorem. :)