Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-00.txt

Jelte Jansen <jelte.jansen@sidn.nl> Thu, 06 April 2017 08:37 UTC

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References: <20170405084256.GA22692@jurassic> <39B58207-4CC2-420B-B774-2766FC80B194@vpnc.org> <20170405145010.GA29337@jurassic>
From: Jelte Jansen <jelte.jansen@sidn.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-00.txt
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On 2017-04-05 16:50, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
>> Also, it is weird that a draft that is about having a fallback if a hash
>> algorithm becomes weakened uses the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme,
>> given that PKCS1 1.5 is already known to be weakened.
> 
> It was to allow simple addition of the algorithm to existing
> implementations. However, in light of your comment, we'll discuss
> revising it.
> 

We can certainly discuss alternative schemes, RSASSA-PSS is a potential
alternative, which I understand is considered (much?) better. It has a
big drawback though, in that it requires salt, which can be a big issue
for large deployments.

An advantage would be that then we not only have an alternative within
the RSA family for SHA2, but also for the signature scheme itself.

Speaking of the use-case to pick up this work; IMO having more
cryptographic algorithms ready for use is generally a good thing; we
don't have to wait until the existing ones are completely broken :)

Jelte