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Re: [DNSOP] On trust anchors, roots of trust, humans and indirection

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Sun, 01 April 2018 17:59 UTC

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Date: Sun, 01 Apr 2018 10:59:28 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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To: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
CC: "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
References: <a9bd794f-41bc-9593-db0d-5424c84431a3@nthpermutation.com> <alpine.DEB.2.11.1803281105310.10477@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk> <cfc66d01-c8ce-b605-8074-8400b377f414@nthpermutation.com> <alpine.DEB.2.11.1803301403230.25657@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk> <CAMm+Lwj5JwrOTfWqNX740bgRYFn4k7gAhOB=cm=LYed=0Pu9pQ@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.DEB.2.11.1803301700030.30706@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk> <5ABE641F.6020501@redbarn.org> <alpine.DEB.2.11.1803312346270.5300@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk> <5AC03BAA.3080601@redbarn.org> <alpine.DEB.2.11.1804011521020.8307@grey.csi.cam.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] On trust anchors, roots of trust, humans and indirection
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Tony Finch wrote:
> Paul Vixie<paul@redbarn.org>  wrote:
>> i suggest that bind, unbound, powerdns, and so on change their packaging to
>> put the trust anchor in a different upgradeable package (.deb, .rpm, etc)
>> than the software itself. until and unless the package manager is secured by
>> DANE rather than by ssh/pgp/x509/etc, then the solution for being on the
>> shelf for several months is, do a software update before you try to go
>> online.
>
> I think that's a good suggestion for the short term. For the longer
> term I would like it to be possible to say that DANE is a reasonable
> way to authenticate software updates, but at the moment it is not.

i believe that software packaging systems will never put that many 
moving parts between their users and their updates. it'll remain some 
flavour of non-distributed keying, like pgp and ssh, simply because of 
the risk/benefit ratio of adding third parties.

i see a bright future for DANE, because of user-driven web and e-mail 
transactions, that are not point-source trust models.

-- 
P Vixie

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