Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Post quantum DNSSEC ?
Paul Hoffman <email@example.com> Tue, 15 October 2019 21:04 UTC
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From: Paul Hoffman <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: "email@example.com" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] [DNSOP] Post quantum DNSSEC ?
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 21:04:25 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Post quantum DNSSEC ?
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On 10/15/19 12:11 PM, John R Levine wrote: > I just heard a most interesting talk at M3AAWG about postquantum crypto and particularly about the NIST candidate algorithms. Many of them have much larger key or signature sizes than any current algorithm, like 10,000 bits or more. Some are a lot slower than others. Has anyone been looking at how these algorithms would or would not work with DNSSEC? Yes. (More specifically: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hoffman-c2pq/, which is very casually being worked on in the CFRG.) Or, define "work with". Falling back to TCP for getting DNSKEY records might not be a big deal. Or, maybe wait until NIST has gotten more through the process, given that key size and signature size are among the many factors they are considering. > NIST is accepting comments and the talk said they particularly want comments from industry on how this would affect existing applications. > > I can imagine ways to make things work, e.g, hashes in some places rather than signatures, but I don't understand DNSSEC in enough detail to figure out what's a show stopper. Or when the show stops. Or what to do if there are multiple selected algorithms with different features (speed, size of signatures, speed of signing, ...) --Paul Hoffman