Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> Thu, 06 September 2018 19:08 UTC

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From: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 15:08:28 -0400
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To: =?UTF-8?Q?Hugo_Salgado=2DHern=C3=A1ndez?= <hsalgado@nic.cl>
Cc: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, dns-operations@dns-oarc.net
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea
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How do you prevent compromise of the central service?

Steve


On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
wrote:

> On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández wrote:
> > > Hi Mukund.
> > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation
> > > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
> >
> > Aha so you're the original source :)
> >
> > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but certainly
> > > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic
> > > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
> > >
> > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as
> > > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
> > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for
> > > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a
> > > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with
> > > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces"
> > > to a central place.
> > >
> > > Hugo
> > >
> > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
> > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=
> 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
> > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/
> presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
> >
> > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my mind I
> > was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
> > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR type +
> > zone transfers to share intermediate effects.
>
> In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
> creates the first key and split the private pieces to each
> signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature
> requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and
> defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11
> interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing
> policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).
>
> Hugo
>
>
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