Re: [DNSOP] rfc4641bis: NSEC vs NSEC3.

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Feb 22, 2010 at 9:23 AM, Evan Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> This is absurd. If we're going to do this, I'd like the security
>> considerations to reflect all of the non-zero probabilities of errors
>> occuring (those that have a higher probability).
>
> I just answered this point in private mail to someone else, failing to
> realize until after I'd sent it that it was off-list, so I'll repeat
> myself...
>
> My point is not to say that hash collisions are a problem or that NSEC3 is
> a poor choice.  My point is that it's bad form to make mathematically false
> statements--even if they're *almost completely* true--and especially so
> when you get anywhere near cryptographers.
>
> "NSEC3 is exactly as good as NSEC" is a mathematical statement.  It's very,
> very close to true, but in math that still makes it false.  "NSEC3 is as
> good as NSEC except under conditions so fantastically improbable that it's
> safe to ignore them" is a few more words, but has the benefit of actually
> being *true*, and I think that's what the draft should say.

Well, I wouldn't want to say "NSEC3 is exactly as good as NSEC" in any
case, since
it's not true. It's more inconvenient to implement, and somewhat more secure.

So, I agree that we shouldn't say things that are factually false, but I'm not
overly concerned about this.

-Ekr