Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients

nalini elkins <> Mon, 11 March 2019 03:25 UTC

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From: nalini elkins <>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 08:55:18 +0530
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To: Christian Huitema <>
Cc: Vittorio Bertola <>, Stephen Farrell <>,,,, "Ackermann, Michael" <>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
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 > Similarly, putting DNS in user space allows for immediate adoption of
DNSSEC and privacy enhancements, even when the operating system or the
local network does not support them

At enterprises (banks, insurance, etc) on their internal networks, people
run their own DNS servers which may resolve for both internal and external

We were recently talking to a Fortune 50 company in the United States about
what might happen you install a version of the browser which uses
DNS-over-HTTPS automatically.  (Clearly, this applies to any variant.)

The questions that the Fortune 50 company architect asked were something
like this:

1. You mean that DNS could be resolved outside my enterprise?

2. So whoever that is that resolves my DNS sees the pattern and frequency
of what sites my company goes to?

3. How do I change this?

I look forward to a discussion on this issue.    There will be at least one
enterprise present in Prague to speak for themselves.  I will see if I can
get others to participate remotely.

It would be good to also discuss how to warn enterprises that this is about
to happen.   I wonder if an announcement via CERT or another group may be


On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 6:36 AM Christian Huitema <>

> On 3/10/2019 4:07 PM, Vittorio Bertola wrote:
> > Honestly, I understood it differently - at this point in time they are
> > doing tests on whether their resolver performs better or worse than
> > the system's one, but their announced model is that Firefox will adopt
> > a DoH resolver (though it's unclear how it will be chosen) and it will
> > just use that one. But if people from Mozilla could make a clearer
> > announcement on what their plans currently are, that would be good.
> > Still, most of the issues arise whenever an application, for whatever
> > reason and under any mechanism, starts to use one or more resolvers
> > different than the one set up in the operating system: even if it used
> > more than one, you would still get many of the issues listed in the
> > document (though, if it used more than one at the same time, I think
> > you'd actually also get some new specific issues, so we'd need to add
> > a discussion of this possibility).
> Your view of operating systems and applications is firmly rooted in
> history, which is another way to say in the past. The evolution in the
> past years points to a systematic deconstruction of that relation, with
> for example virtual machine, containers, or the trend to move network
> stacks out of the operating system and into the application. This is
> pretty obvious for security stacks, but it is also becoming very clear
> with QUIC and transport stacks. There are two big drivers: portability,
> and rapid adoption of innovation. These two drivers apply to DNS just
> like they apply to transport.
> Putting QUIC in application space allows for immediate provision of
> innovations like 0-RTT, head-of-queue blocking mitigation, or the better
> crypto of TLS 1.3. Similarly, putting DNS in user space allows for
> immediate adoption of DNSSEC and privacy enhancements, even when the
> operating system or the local network does not support them. That genie
> is not going back in the bottle any time soon.
> -- Christian Huitema
> _______________________________________________
> dns-privacy mailing list

Nalini Elkins
Enterprise Data Center Operators