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Re: [DNSOP] dnssec-kskroll-sentinel-06 clarifications

Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat@nic.cz> Mon, 19 March 2018 16:10 UTC

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From: Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat@nic.cz>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] dnssec-kskroll-sentinel-06 clarifications
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On 03/18/2018 09:44 PM, Petr Špaček wrote:
> The current text in section 5 is written with an assumption that query
> with +CD bit cannot result in "Secure" status and thus cannot trigger
> sentinel processing, but this depends on implementation.

I just want to note that this situation of answering +cd queries by
validated cached RRs isn't very implementation-specific.  One way to
come to this: it seems generally desirable to have aggressive caching
(rfc8198) on forwarders, due to serving as a cache shared by multiple
resolvers, and validating resolvers tend to use +cd to query the
forwarders (rfc4035#section-3.2.2).

--Vladimir

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