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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSOP: question about hardening "something like mDNS"
 against attacks
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On Oct 26, 2020, at 4:14 PM, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
> And the question from the AD was what could be done. So, do you have =
any
> implemention suggestion ? Are there any sugestions for mDNS ?

There are no simple mitigations. If there were, they would already be in =
the protocol.

> Btw: I do agree that for most use of mDNS as it is relying on dynamic =
ports,
> my suggestion would create an undesired trend of allocating static =
port numbers.
> This is also true for GRASP in general, but for the specific use-cases
> in mind in my text, which are really inside-network infra protocols, =
the argument could be
> made that static port allocation was indeed well feasible (as we're =
talking about a
> very small number here) . But we had not done it because we hadn't =
vetted the benefits
> of doing such a port allocation.

If it=E2=80=99s a multicast discovery protocol with no authentication, =
then constraining the set of allowed ports just means that the node =
that=E2=80=99s attacking you has to be able to listen on that port, =
which it likely can. So I think this reduces function without increasing =
hardening.

What actually hardens mDNS is that it=E2=80=99s a link-local protocol. =
It doesn=E2=80=99t work across links. This limits the attack surface. =
But there=E2=80=99s no way to eliminate the attack surface.  If I were =
in Ben=E2=80=99s shoes, I=E2=80=99d be asking you to change the protocol =
to support authentication and ToFU as a hardening strategy, with some =
better trust establishment mechanism as future work based on the =
existing presence of crypto signatures. But the current consensus of the =
IETF is apparently that ADs aren=E2=80=99t allowed to insist on things =
like that. :(

