[DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only​: exchanging DS set

Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz> Fri, 31 July 2020 09:01 UTC

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To: dnsop@ietf.org
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 11:00:48 +0200
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Bqz60pHWNya0zr-qymipIH97BBY>
Subject: [DNSOP] =?utf-8?q?draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only=E2=80=8B=3A_e?= =?utf-8?q?xchanging_DS_set?=
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Hello dnsop.

Let me start a simple thought experiment - attacking the planned
scheme.  It feels like I'm missing some part of the defense.

A .evil registry is using the DELEGATION_ONLY flag.  They additionally
sign a different victim.evil DS set, say adding hash of a DNSKEY they
generated themselves.  Now they could serve it e.g. to specific targets,
allowing .evil to control contents of the victim.evil subtree as seen by
those targets.  The defense against this will be logging!  So this DS
set along with its proof chain should get logged by some of the targets.

So far it's been clear.  But now... how do we know that this fake
victim.evil DS set was not submitted by the registrant?  I assume every
registrant is supposed to watch the logs from everyone for such fakes? 
Sounds OK-ish, so if they do find an incorrect set, they know that the
registry is "bad" (intentionally or not), but how can they prove *to
anyone else* that they did not submit it to the registry?

Without that ability I'd still feel quite powerless as a registrant, and
I currently can't see a nice way of solving that.  It would be nice if
there was a way we could get the ability in future (for reasonable costs).

- - -
I do support the aims of the draft, but so far the plan doesn't make me
feel safer, and deploying *all* the necessary parts doesn't seem very
easy either.  I'm sorry if I've missed something.  Well, *my* trust
isn't really important here, so if dnsop thinks the approach will
increase trust of some more important parties...

--Vladimir