Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing-05.txt
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Tue, 23 September 2014 15:51 UTC
Return-Path: <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A65A51A8721 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:51:31 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.647
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.647 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id h9bkeMwH02zz for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:51:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from proper.com (Hoffman.Proper.COM [207.182.41.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4BB101A86FA for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:51:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [10.20.30.90] (50-1-50-250.dsl.dynamic.fusionbroadband.com [50.1.50.250]) (authenticated bits=0) by proper.com (8.14.9/8.14.7) with ESMTP id s8NFpREW001320 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:51:29 -0700 (MST) (envelope-from paul.hoffman@vpnc.org)
X-Authentication-Warning: proper.com: Host 50-1-50-250.dsl.dynamic.fusionbroadband.com [50.1.50.250] claimed to be [10.20.30.90]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\))
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
In-Reply-To: <m24mvyjqcc.wl-Niall.oReilly@ucd.ie>
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:51:26 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <16CE283F-A436-43F0-B5B6-52CBC57C8DAB@vpnc.org>
References: <20140917121858.30503.75097.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <541B29CE.5040908@gmail.com> <C3C8B727-1B0C-4DA2-9885-B4AFEC9F3580@vpnc.org> <m24mvyjqcc.wl-Niall.oReilly@ucd.ie>
To: Niall O'Reilly <Niall.oReilly@ucd.ie>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6)
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/BrEY47tWLS7nDO4VNZkG_952PMA
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing-05.txt
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 15:51:31 -0000
On Sep 23, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Niall O'Reilly <Niall.oReilly@ucd.ie> wrote: > At Mon, 22 Sep 2014 20:06:06 -0700, > Paul Hoffman wrote: >> >> I did a clean read, and it feels *much* better than the early drafts. I have a small number of editorial comments, but some bigger questions as well. I strongly suspect the questions can be answered by small additions to the draft. >> >> At the beginning of 2.1: >> For ZSKs, the issue for the zone operator/signer is to ensure that >> any caching validator has access to a particular signature that >> corresponds to a valid ZSK. >> "that corresponds to" seem wrong here. The following may be more accurate (or it might be wrong...): >> For ZSKs, the issue for the zone operator/signer is to ensure that >> any caching validator has access to a particular signature has >> access to the corresponding valid ZSK. > > I can't parse the last sentence above and would appreciate > clarification. > > The noun clause which is apparently intended as the object of the > infinitive "to ensure" contains two finite verbs. Perhaps a > sub-ordinating conjunction has been omitted? Does the following help? For ZSKs, the issue for the zone operator/signer is to ensure that any caching validator has access to a particular signature also has access to the corresponding valid ZSK. Or: For ZSKs, the issue for the zone operator/signer is to ensure that if a caching validator has access to a particular signature, the validator also has access to the corresponding valid ZSK. --Paul Hoffman
- [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-key-t… internet-drafts
- [DNSOP] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-… Tim Wicinski
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Niall O'Reilly
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Niall O'Reilly
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Stephen Morris
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-k… Paul Hoffman