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Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Tue, 28 February 2017 21:35 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 16:35:40 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec>
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Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update
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On Tue, 28 Feb 2017, Roy Arends wrote:

> Since the last update of this draft, a full collision has been found.
>
> Do the authors intend to update the draft to state that SHA1 SHOULD NOT be used for DNSSEC signing (DNSKEY algorithm 5,6,7) and for DNSSEC Delegation (DS and CDS algorithm 1) ?

That seems a bit dramatic to this author :)

We can't stuff PDF prefixes into this, there are a lot less bytes
for an attacker to play with.

> Please also refrain from using MUST- SHOULD+ and SHOULD-.

For this SHA1 case or in general? I'd say we could update the DNSSEC
Signing entry from MUST- to SHOULD NOT but I would leave SHA1 for
DNSSEC validation at MUST-.

There is a need to move people away from SHA1, but I don't think this
specific attack changing anything with respect to DNSSEC.

Paul

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