Re: [DNSOP] Validating stubs? Was: Re: WG review of draft-ietf-homenet-dot-03

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Thu, 23 March 2017 18:01 UTC

Return-Path: <marka@isc.org>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33CF3129B4B for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 11:01:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.901
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Wr_uXX8I6ghR for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 11:01:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx.pao1.isc.org (mx.pao1.isc.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:0:2::2b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B2C41315D3 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 11:01:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org (zmx1.isc.org [149.20.0.20]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx.pao1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35CAD3495C8; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:41 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 268C016006D; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:41 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15350160071; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:41 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (zmx1.isc.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id UV7uRMBDxGfW; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:41 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from rock.dv.isc.org (dhcp-wifi-204.sql1.isc.org [149.20.50.204]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EC03216006D; Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:40 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from rock.dv.isc.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by rock.dv.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B86868474B3; Fri, 24 Mar 2017 05:01:40 +1100 (AEDT)
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
Cc: "dnsop@ietf.org WG" <dnsop@ietf.org>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <CAH1iCiq6nVGMpv7c1UVc8SurOWLQK1DViETof4W06tRXes=rSA@mail.gmail.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 22 Mar 2017 16:08:25 -0700." <CAH1iCiq6nVGMpv7c1UVc8SurOWLQK1DViETof4W06tRXes=rSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 05:01:40 +1100
Message-Id: <20170323180140.1B86868474B3@rock.dv.isc.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Dx0c2laPGIKBFZsQ7aGxLKPDshg>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Validating stubs? Was: Re: WG review of draft-ietf-homenet-dot-03
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 18:01:45 -0000

In message <CAH1iCiq6nVGMpv7c1UVc8SurOWLQK1DViETof4W06tRXes=rSA@mail.gmail.com>
, Brian Dickson writes:
> 
> I was thinking about the DNSSEC validation by stubs, with respect to the
> homenet discussion.
> 
> And, I was wondering about various trust anchor options (other than ICANN's
> current root trust anchor).
> 
> It occurred to me, that any non-ICANN trust anchor, would possibly require
> 5011 key rolls under certain circumstances.
> 
> Which begs the question: are validating stub resolvers presumed to be
> 5011-capable?
> 
> But, I realize, the issue of 5011 capability also exists for the root trust
> anchor.
> 
> So, the dilemma is:
> 
>    - Can we assume 5011 stub support regardless?
>    - If not, does this make the DNSSEC issue for homenet moot, since the
>    root KSK will be rolled in the near future (for some value of "near
>    future"), and break stub validation?
> 
> On the other hand, if 5011 support by stubs is assumed, there is one
> interesting option:
> 
> Establish a trust anchor for homenet (whatever name is used), AND publish
> the private keys.
> 
> This creates the ability to have a master DNS authority server, in any
> given homenet instance, sign the data in the homenet zone. The default
> software could/would need to ship with the trust anchor, and the private
> key. The out-of-the-box behavior would just work, and would verify/validate
> properly for validating stubs that ship with the homenet trust anchor.
> 
> There would then be the ability for users running their own homenet
> networks, to do the equivalent of changing the default password -- they
> would be able to do a 5011 key roll, which would cause the default trust
> anchor to be replaced with a unique trust anchor for that specific homenet.
> 
> It's not part of the homenet standard (yet), but might be worth thinking
> about.
> 
> Again, the main question is, has an assumption about 5011 support in stubs
> been made, and is it a valid assumption?
> 
> If not, to re-emphasize, then the "unsigned delegation" thing isn't even
> necessary, since the stub resolvers won't be able to validate ANYTHING.

The output state of the validator is "secure", "insecure" and "bogus".

Without a insecure delegation the only result a validator can return is
"bogus".

With a insecure delegtion we get "insecure" by default and when the
client gets a trust anchor for "homenet", it can return "secure",
"insecure" and "bogus".

> Brian
> 
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org