Re: [DNSOP] Status of "let localhost be localhost"?

[Mike West <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 3:23 AM, Mark Andrews <[e-mail]> wrote:

> In message <[e-mail]>, Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews writes:
> > On 08/01/2017 03:48 AM, Mike West wrote:
> > > The only open issue I know of is some discussion in the thread at
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg18690.html
> that I
> > > need help synthesizing into the draft. I don't know enough about the
> > > subtleties here to have a strong opinion, and I'm happy to accept the
> > > consensus of the group.
> >
> > Reading back through this thread, it seems like the concerns were about
> > how to represent the  ".localhost" TLD in the root zone, or how to use
> > DNSSEC to express that the root zone will not speak for ".localhost".
> > However, I think we don't need either. This draft attempts to codify the
> > idea that queries for "localhost" or "foo.localhost" should never leave
> > the local system, and so it doesn't matter what the root zone says about
> > ".localhost".
> >
> > I would even take it a step further: It would be a mistake to add any
> > records for ".localhost" to the root zone, because it would mask
> > implementation errors. If a local resolver accidentally allows a query
> > for "foo.localhost" to hit the wire, it should result in an error.
> >
> > IMHO, the document is good as it stands.
>
> The query for foo.localhost doesn't need to hit-the-wire for this
> to be a issue.  Ask your self why RFC 6303, Security section has
>
>    As DNSSEC is deployed within the IN-ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA
>    namespaces, the zones listed above will need to be delegated as
>    insecure delegations, or be within insecure zones.  This will
>    allow DNSSEC validation to succeed for queries in these spaces
>    despite not being answered from the delegated servers.
>
> or draft-ietf-homenet-dot-10 is doing the same thing for "home.arpa".
>
> We didn't add the requirement for insecure delegations for the fun
> of it.  We added it so that the tools that validate will not break
> when those names are being used.
>
> The only difference between the names in the above documents and
> .localhost is the size of the space where they are valid.  It is
> restricted to the node rather than the site.
>

Thanks for the feedback, Mark!

What would you like to see in the document in order to address this
concern? A requirement that a `localhost` zone be created and delegated as
an insecure delegation, using some of the language from the draft above
(e.g. "This delegation MUST NOT be signed, MUST NOT include a DS record,
and MUST point to one or more black hole servers, for example '
blackhole-1.iana.org.' and 'blackhole-2.iana.org.'.")?

-mike