Re: [DNSOP] Concerns around deployment of DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Wed, 13 March 2019 23:10 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
To: ek@loon.co
Cc: Kenji Baheux <kenjibaheux=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, IETF DNSOP WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 23:10:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Concerns around deployment of DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
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On Wednesday, 13 March 2019 19:23:55 UTC Erik Kline wrote:
> > If there is a malicious user or app on a network that someone is trying to
> > protect, isn't the very existence of these players the actual issue that
> > needs to be addressed?
> 
> I tend to think this is the real issue.  Any app can craft its own
> non-cleartext-DNS name resolution service; DoH makes it a bit easier
> perhaps, but not much (vis. JSON DNS, etc...).

if you guys would appreciate a half day seminar on network security economics, 
in which the value of anomalousness will figure prominently, let's meet up.

> My suspicion is that controlling a network's DNS is less and less likely to
> be a decent control point for network security w.r.t. to the craftier
> apps.

your suspicion directly contradicts both my long-term and recent experience.

> I'm sure the monitoring and interference with things looking up
> "really-evil.evil" still has some value.  But much more sophistication is
> probably required nowadays to deal with even moderately competent
> adversaries...I suspect.

alas, meeting only the most competent adversaries is not a choice we can make.

vixie