[DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07.txt
internet-drafts@ietf.org Wed, 18 October 2017 21:21 UTC
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Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2017 14:21:20 -0700
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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations WG of the IETF.
Title : Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
Authors : Wes Hardaker
Warren Kumari
Filename : draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07.txt
Pages : 15
Date : 2017-10-18
Abstract:
This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing
advice that must be followed in order to maintain security.
Specifically, this document describes the math behind the minimum
time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before signing
exclusively with recently added DNSKEYs. It contains much math and
complicated equations, but the summary is that the key rollover /
revocation time is much longer than intuition would suggest. If you
are not both publishing a DNSSEC trust anchor, and using RFC5011 to
update that trust anchor, you probably don't need to read this
document.
This document also describes the minimum time-length that a DNS zone
publisher must wait after publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming
that all active RFC5011 resolvers should have seen the revocation-
marked key and removed it from their list of trust anchors.
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations/
There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07
A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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