Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-rebs-dnsop-svcb-dane-00.txt

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sun, 12 December 2021 20:14 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-rebs-dnsop-svcb-dane-00.txt
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On Sun, Dec 12, 2021 at 09:49:57AM +0100, Philip Homburg wrote:

> >> There is something I don't understand about this draft.
> >
> >The main thing to understand is that complex applications like browsers
> >allow data retrieved from one endpoint to script interaction with a
> >*different* endpoint, and possibly see the retrieved content, subject to
> >various CORS (Cross-origin resource sharing) controls.
> 
> Indeed this is subject to CORS. Nothing new here. Any browser needs to get
> this right.

Perhaps I failed to explain the issue, but that does not mean that there
is no issue.

The browser may be communicating with a victim server believing its name
to be the same as the attacker's server, and therefore allowing attacker
served scripts (from a prior connection) to script the interaction with
the victim server.  The victim server may believe it has a secure
connection with the client (based perhaps a client-certificate-signed
handshake) and may allow it retrieve sensitive data.

Cookie-based authentication does not appear to be vulnerable here, since
the browser would presumably not send victim site cookies to a site
it believes to be the attacker.

If the victim site uses https, but authenticates clients by internal IP
alone, again there could be an issue.

I don't know how to explain this better, you could ask on a cryptography
or TLS-related forum, this is DNSOP, where the expertise tends to be of
a different nature.

-- 
    Viktor.