Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl> Thu, 06 September 2018 19:03 UTC

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Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 16:02:57 -0300
From: Hugo =?iso-8859-1?Q?Salgado-Hern=E1ndez?= <hsalgado@nic.cl>
To: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>
Cc: dnsop@ietf.org, dns-operations@dns-oarc.net
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea
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On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández wrote:
> > Hi Mukund.
> > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation
> > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
> 
> Aha so you're the original source :)
> 
> > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but certainly
> > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic
> > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
> > 
> > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as
> > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
> > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for
> > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a
> > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with
> > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces"
> > to a central place.
> > 
> > Hugo
> > 
> > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
> > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
> > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
> 
> So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my mind I
> was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
> dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR type +
> zone transfers to share intermediate effects.

In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
creates the first key and split the private pieces to each
signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature
requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and
defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11
interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing
policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).

Hugo