Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for: draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel

[Job Snijders <[e-mail]>]

Dear all,

For what it's worth - all my concerns have been addressed. I believe
the document to be in good shape now and would support a progression
through WG LC. I appreciate the effort the authors have put into
making this an exemplary specification!

Kind regards,

Job


On Mon, Jun 11, 2018 at 7:30 PM, Warren Kumari <[e-mail]> wrote:
> Dear WG (and chairs),
>
> Firstly, thank you to everyone who supported this, those who provided
> comments (especially pull requests!) and implementers.
>
> We have made a number of improvements to the documents based upon your
> comments - the diff can be seen here:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-10&url2=draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel-14
>
> Possibly more helpful is the GitHub list of Pull Requests:
> https://github.com/APNIC-Labs/draft-kskroll-sentinel/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed
>
> We've added an implementation section - I know that there were more "client"
> side (the Javascript or similar automated tests); I'd been keeping a note
> with a list, but seem to have misplaced it.
>
> BIND and Unbound now support this; AFAIK, Knot supports the older name.
>
>
> I *think* that we've managed to address the comments, but if we happened to
> miss yours, please let us know.
>
> From my read of the WGs views, these, being *labels*, are not *Special Use
> Domain Names*, and so don't need to be added to the SUDN registry.
>
> The authors would like to thank the WG again, and ask that WGLC be resumed.
>
> W
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 9:02 AM Ondřej Surý <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> And the MR was peer-review and merged into BIND master branch with intent
>> to backport the feature into older release branches.
>>
>> I don’t think it’s a useful or helpful to change the rules for existing
>> adopted work.  We need to have a discussion on the mechanisms that would
>> allow implementors to know when to start the implementation of existing
>> draft. From implementors point, it makes little sense to start implementing
>> before the protocol change is almost fully baked (aka WGLC and further),
>> because until then the protocol might change considerably.
>>
>> So, if we require implementation report further down the road, it needs to
>> be more clearly defined than people suddenly shouting “this is not ready”
>> when WGLC starts.  And while the attempt to implement something is certainly
>> useful to get valuable feedback, it also imposes some costs (with undefined
>> limit) on implementors (especially the open source implementors) and it sort
>> of discards the whole “Proposed Standard” -> “Internet Standard”
>> classification at global IETF level.
>>
>> I get that we probably need something more lightweight than “Internet
>> Standard” at the WG level, but this needs to be discussed and consensus
>> reached.
>>
>> ISC gave our feedback during the implementation and here are some nits
>> from me (re-reading the document again):
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>> Section "2.  Protocol Walkthrough Example" will be made into Appendix at
>> publication time, so just reminder here that you also need to change the
>> references like "(see the logic below)” when you move the section - perhaps
>> add direct reference to the other section this refers to?
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>> The table in 3.2 says:
>>
>> "Key Tag is trusted” and “Key Tag is not trusted” - it seems little bit
>> confusing to me; I think that “Key is trusted” and “Key is not trusted”; or
>> some change similar to this needs to be made:
>>
>> “First, the resolver determines if the Key Tag is trusted by comparing
>> numerical value of <key-tag>
>>    to any of the Key Tags of an active root zone KSK which is
>>    currently trusted…"
>>
>> in paragraph just before the table you mix “Key Tag” and “keytag” and
>> there’s also <key-tag>…
>>
>> My understanding of the text and the proposed fix:
>>
>> […]
>>
>>    First, the resolver determines if the numerical value of <key-tag> is
>>    equal to any of the Key Tags of an active root zone KSK which is
>>    currently trusted by the local resolver and is stored in its store of
>>    trusted keys.  If a match is found the <key-tag> is trusted. An active
>>    root zone KSK is one which could currently be used for
>>    validation (that is, a key that is not in either the AddPend or
>>    Revoked state as described in [RFC5011]).
>>
>>    Second, the resolver alters the response being sent to the original
>>    query based on both the left-most label and the presence of a key
>>    with given Key Tag in the trust anchor store.  Two labels and two
>>    possible states of the <key-tag> generate four possible combinations
>>    summarized in the table:
>>
>>     Label      |   <key-tag> is trusted    |   <key-tag> is not trusted
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     is-ta      | return original answer  | return SERVFAIL
>>     not-ta     | return SERVFAIL         | return original answer
>>
>> […]
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>>    o  A query name that is signed with a DNSSEC signature that cannot be
>>       validated (such as if the corresponding RRset is not signed with a
>>       valid RRSIG record).
>>
>> This is called “Bogus” by RFC 4033 Section 5 -> maybe a reference?
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>> In  Section: 7.  Privacy Considerations
>>
>> s/mechansim/mechanism/
>>
>> ~~~
>>
>> That is all folks.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Ondrej
>> --
>> Ondřej Surý
>> [e-mail]
>>
>> > On 7 Apr 2018, at 08:27, Evan Hunt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >
>> > On Fri, Apr 06, 2018 at 10:09:50PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> >> I think I heard that ISC was considering adding support, but was
>> >> planning on waiting till RFC / some sort of LC.
>> >
>> > Yes. The work in progress is available here:
>> > https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/merge_requests/123
>> >
>> > --
>> > Evan Hunt -- [e-mail]
>> > Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > DNSOP mailing list
>> > [e-mail]
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>>
>
>
> --
> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad idea in
> the first place.
> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair of
> pants.
>    ---maf
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>