Re: [DNSOP] If DNSSEC signatures do not validate ...

Davey Song <songlinjian@gmail.com> Tue, 28 April 2020 14:22 UTC

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From: Davey Song <songlinjian@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 22:22:18 +0800
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To: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] If DNSSEC signatures do not validate ...
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That language could probably use some clarification. I would interpret
> "if .. none of the RRSIGs can be validated" as "if .. none of the RRSIGs
> can be validated from _any_ of the authority servers". In practice, every
> validating resolver I'm familiar with will retry other servers upon
> signature
> validation failure.
>

OK. It make sense to try every name servers to defend the case if the
adversary only intercept one path. But the adversary also know the resolver
will retry other servers. So a smarter adversary may intercept in the
aggregated upstreaming path where all queries are sent.

Otherwise, we would have a very fragile system - an
> adversary would just have to be able to intercept one path between resolver
> and one of the authority servers for a zone to cause resolution failure.
>

Davey

>