Re: [DNSOP] DNSOP Call for Adoption draft-vixie-dns-rpz

Matthew Pounsett <matt@conundrum.com> Wed, 21 December 2016 17:52 UTC

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From: Matthew Pounsett <matt@conundrum.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:52:22 -0500
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSOP Call for Adoption draft-vixie-dns-rpz
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On 21 December 2016 at 12:47, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:

> On Dec 21, 2016, at 12:39 PM, Matthew Pounsett <matt@conundrum.com> wrote:
>
> None of those things are required by RPZ, but I believe they are required
> by the hypothetical better alternative that a few people have suggested we
> should work on instead.
>
>
> To be clear, there is no real alternative to RPZ in terms of providing
> protection.   We could provide annotation in RPZ, and that might be useful
> in some cases.   But ultimately if a domain is malicious, you _have_ to
> block it by not providing an answer.   If you do not, only those devices
> that implement the new protocol will be protected, which is to say we will
> be failing broken, not failing safe.
>

You and I are in energetic agreement.


>
> If you want the browser to receive and understand a signal then that
> signal needs to be invented, the DNS servers need to be modified to send
> it, and the browsers (and all other applications you want to benefit) need
> to be modified to receive and understand it.  This is the point I was
> making.
>
>
> Yes, correct.   I proposed a draft in tls to do this after the redirect
> has happened, which I think is useful, but does not solve the problem of
> signaling when DNSSEC is available: https://tools.ietf.
> org/html/draft-lemon-tls-blocking-alert-00
>
> If we wanted to account for DNSSEC and provide signaling, I think the
> signaling would have to take the form of a signed EDNS0 option that
> signaled similar information.
>
> In the draft I’m referencing, it was my intention to provide a set of
> values that could be returned to indicate what has happened.   I think it’s
> a bad idea to provide anything more than that, because for example if you
> return a text string, that becomes an attack surface.   You can use it to
> trick the user into bypassing their security settings.
>
>
>