Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Tue, 12 February 2019 18:34 UTC

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To: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers
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David Conrad wrote on 2019-02-12 10:14:
> Paul,
> 
> On Feb 12, 2019, at 8:32 AM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org 
> <mailto:paul@redbarn.org>> wrote:
>> DoH is _dangerous_ because it's my network and i require all visitors, 
>> family members, employees, and apps to use the control plane i have 
>> constructed, which includes DNS surveillance and control. 
> 
> Why don’t you force folks on your network to install a certificate that 
> would allow you to inspect TCP/443 outbound traffic?  How can you be 
> sure folks on your network aren’t already tunneling their evil deeds 
> through HTTPS?

netflow. such traffic _looks_ abnormal.

the deliberate design premise of DoH is that it look normal.

-- 
P Vixie