Re: [DNSOP] [internet-drafts@ietf.org: I-D Action: draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-nxdomain-cut-00.txt]

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Thu, 12 November 2015 08:17 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 09:15:14 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [internet-drafts@ietf.org: I-D Action: draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-nxdomain-cut-00.txt]
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On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 01:15:37AM +0000,
 Wessels, Duane <dwessels@verisign.com> wrote 
 a message of 107 lines which said:

> This updates RFC 2308 (Negative Caching of DNS Queries).

Good point, I'll add that. Also, I did not dare to add "Updates: RFC
1034". Should I?

> I think the WG needs to discuss and agree whether or not to make the
> NXDOMAIN cut based on QNAME only, or on the SOA owner name.

This is discussed (shortly) in section 5 of the draft. Apparently, it
can be risky to rely on the SOA. More discussion welcome.

> If the goal is to thwart random qname attacks, then it would be
> better to use the SOA

Sure, if you don't have access to the resolver (if you do, you can
"poison" it with a request QNAME=apex-of-the-attack).

> Implementing NXDOMAIN cut should also reduce the effectiveness of a
> Kaminsky attack since the attack relies on the cache to forward
> numerous non-existent names.

Right.

> I think its a little dangerous to say that an NXDOMAIN response
> SHOULD cause a cache to delete already cached "positive" data.

Could you elaborate why is it dangerous? (See also the second
paragraph of section 7.)