Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Tue, 12 February 2019 22:08 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:08:45 -0800
In-Reply-To: <cb9646e3-676d-c24f-240d-e0c8ed159e88@redbarn.org>
Cc: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers
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On Feb 12, 2019, at 1:48 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>; wrote:
> DoH _specifically_ evades this, by looking as much as possible like other traffic to IP addresses shared by a lot of existing traffic. 

Right.   So what’s to stop other malicious traffic from doing the same thing?

IOW, you seem to want DoH to go away, but will that actually solve your problem?   If so, how?