Re: [DNSOP] IETF meeting prep and what

[Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>]

Peter et al -

It might be useful to review RFC 4986 - 
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4986.html - Requirements Related to 
DNS Security Trust Anchor Rollover - to understand what the problem 
requirements were/are before resurrecting this discussion again.   If 
the requirements have changed, then perhaps we need a new solution, but 
we should probably update 4986 before tossing 5011.

Peter -

WRT to your analogy to the CA system, I will note that browser clients 
(where the trust anchors are embedded for the CA) are not even close to 
being updated in the same manner as recursive resolvers (not simply "DNS 
clients") and many resolvers are used to provide services within various 
small and large organizations rather than being owned and updated by a 
single person.   For one thing, there are orders of magnitude more 
browers than there are resolvers.  For another,  resolvers are rarely 
updated automatically.   What would be interesting is to get some idea 
of the set of resolvers with no active management being performed on 
them - including software updates.

Mike



On 6/30/2021 2:59 PM, Peter van Dijk wrote:
> Hello DNSOP,
>
>> I propose replacing rfc5011-security-considerations with a short document deprecating 5011 in its entirety. I am happy to write text for that, if there is an appetite - when the WG queue is small enough!
> I see this ruffled some feathers. Here's a more nuanced version.
>
> I feel that 5011, for the purpose of root key rollovers, is the wrong tool, -especially- combined with the trust anchor signaling that various resolver stacks sent to the root. Lack of clarity about where various signals came from, combined with some interesting bugs in implementations, has led to a lot of wild goose chases, and it would not surprise me (but I cannot prove) that bad data is what delayed the first roll for so long. Not actual problems predicted by the data; just bad data. (I have mentioned before that I think the trust anchor signalling was a mistake too, and any calls for 'more of this' are 'calls for more bad data' and we do not need more bad data.)
>
> I feel that the right mechanism for root key distribution is software distributors. This is working fine for the CA system, and with keys announced far enough in advance, should work fine for DNSSEC. Software distributors have solved this problem; they are very good at distributing things; I suggest we let them solve this for us.
>
> rfc5011-security-considerations is a good document, and I apologise for targeting it unfairly - my problem with 5011 is as above. Given my next two point, it probably makes sense to publish rfc5011-security-considerations.
>
> With heaps of 5011 'client' implementations out there, I am in no way proposing that root rolls happen in a way that that software could not follow along. I am only proposing that we write down that 5011 is not the best fit for the problem, and recommend against more client implementations of it *for the purpose of root key rolls*.
>
> I think (can't find it right now) that somebody mentioned that 5011 has its place outside of the root key system, inside enterprises. I'm inclined to disagree, but do not feel entirely capable of judging that. If (again, when there's WG bandwidth) we draft a document about why 5011 is a bad fit for the root, perhaps somebody can contribute text about the level-of-fit for other use cases.
>
> Kind regards,