Re: [DNSOP] Key sizes was Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-01.txt

Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> Sat, 25 April 2009 01:45 UTC

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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2009 21:46:15 -0400
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Key sizes was Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-01.txt
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On 24 Apr 2009, at 21:17, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> At 7:53 PM -0400 4/24/09, Joe Abley wrote:
>> It seems fruitless to debate whether 1024 bits is sufficient if  
>> there's no real cost to just choosing (say) 4096 bits and avoiding  
>> the discussion.
>
> Please read the text: larger keys incur a real cost to people  
> validating.

The text contains the following sentence: "In a standard CPU, it takes  
about four times as long to sign or verify with a 2048-bit key as it  
does with a 1024-bit key." I couldn't find any other discussion of the  
cost to validators of large key sizes.

If there is a practical limit to key size due to concerns about  
peoples' validators running out of steam, then I think it needs to be  
stated clearly. Otherwise as a zone administrator my instinct will be  
to use keys that are as large as possible, since the costs incurred by  
doing so are going to be borne by other people and all I see is  
benefit (in the form of increased comfort level and a better story for  
upper management, even if there is no practical improvement in  
security).

On the flip side, how can the "real cost" for validator-operators that  
you assert be quantified?

I have a hand in running a couple of non-validating resolvers for a  
local ISP. 35,000 customers are served by two machines running BIND  
9.5.x on FreeBSD 7.1, and the CPUs are 96% idle at peak load. That's a  
fair amount of headroom, even ignoring the fact that the ISP in  
question is in the process of replacing each machine with an ECMP/OSPF  
cluster of two machines in order to simplify ad-hoc maintenance.

I'm not arguing about the assertion that there is a limit to what  
validators can tolerate. However, it seems reasonable to ask if it's  
the kind of limit that we need to worry about, and not, the kind of  
limit that is always going to fit in that headroom as validator  
hardware gets upgraded on a typical cycle and DNSSEC deployment  
proceeds over time.


Joe