Re: [DNSOP] nsec3-parameters opinions gathered

Benno Overeinder <benno@NLnetLabs.nl> Fri, 05 November 2021 16:10 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Nov 2021 17:09:47 +0100
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To: DNSOP Working Group <dnsop@ietf.org>, Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
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From: Benno Overeinder <benno@NLnetLabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] nsec3-parameters opinions gathered
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Wes,

On 05/11/2021 09:40, Vladimír Čunát wrote:
> On 04/11/2021 23.44, Wes Hardaker wrote:
>> The most important sticking point is there are 4 implementations (thank
>> you for the links Matthijs) that have implemented 150.  Since DNSOP
>> strives for implementations of specs, I think this is the number we
>> should publish*unless the vendors speak up and say they'll drive lower*.
> 
> I'm convinced that 150 was just a quick stop-gap compromise and that 
> from the start vendors expected that dnsop might set it lower later. 
> Therefore I don't think this *argument* for keeping 150 is really valid.
> 
> As for Knot Resolver, I see no problem in setting the hard limit lower, 
> especially if that gets published in this RFC.  From Viktor I gather 
> that 100 shouldn't cause issues even at this moment, especially if it's 
> only a limit for downgrading to insecure (which won't be even noticed by 
> most DNS consumers).  So personally I expected the draft to lower the 
> bound to <=100, though as I said... for us the *overall* performance 
> ratio from e.g. 150 -> 50 isn't that large.

For Unbound, we have no problem setting the iteration cap to a value 
lower than the current 150.  If Viktor's analysis shows a limit of 100 
is feasible without (m)any problems for operators, and this value will 
be adopted in the soon-to-be-released RFC, we will use the new limit value.


Cheers,

-- Benno


-- 
Benno J. Overeinder
NLnet Labs
https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/