Re: [DNSOP] Concerns around deployment of DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Wed, 13 March 2019 07:41 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
Cc: Kenji Baheux <kenjibaheux=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 07:41:32 +0000
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Organization: Vixie Freehold
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Concerns around deployment of DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
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On Wednesday, 13 March 2019 02:33:14 UTC Kenji Baheux wrote:
> *(Sincere apologies about the multi-posting but the discussion seems to be
> happening in different places...)*
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I'm involved with Chrome's DoH efforts.
> 
> ...
> 
> PS: I won't be able to join IETF 104 to discuss this face to face, but I
> will see if someone from our side can represent us.

thank you for this information. can i request that you offer DoT as a 
solution, not just DoH? they offer the same capabilities of secrecy and 
authenticity, but DoT can be cheaply disabled by the network operator, whereas 
a malicious user or app using DoH will be very expensive to detect or prevent 
at the network level.

vixie