Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Sun, 28 April 2024 22:18 UTC

Return-Path: <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B756EC14F6A3 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.898
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.898 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EBe9_iMRc526 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ppa4.dc.icann.org (ppa4.dc.icann.org [192.0.46.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48E9FC14F602 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from MBX112-W2-CO-1.pexch112.icann.org (out.mail.icann.org [64.78.33.5]) by ppa4.dc.icann.org (8.18.1.2/8.18.1.2) with ESMTPS id 43SMI4WQ023775 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:05 -0700
Received: from MBX112-W2-CO-1.pexch112.icann.org (10.226.41.128) by MBX112-W2-CO-2.pexch112.icann.org (10.226.41.130) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.1258.28; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:22 -0700
Received: from MBX112-W2-CO-1.pexch112.icann.org ([169.254.44.235]) by MBX112-W2-CO-1.pexch112.icann.org ([169.254.44.235]) with mapi id 15.02.1258.028; Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:18:21 -0700
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost
Thread-Index: AQHamQSFCHELV4o81ku05bCOXPJQ+rF+t0SA
Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 22:18:21 +0000
Message-ID: <D95A2D1F-1203-4434-B643-DDFB5C24A161@icann.org>
References: <CADyWQ+F7mm2duU7N9F=5NadorX4xzUCjaZbNVHBU=NC2HGJr6g@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CADyWQ+F7mm2duU7N9F=5NadorX4xzUCjaZbNVHBU=NC2HGJr6g@mail.gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [192.0.32.234]
x-source-routing-agent: True
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <AE8922E869C4F84E882AED72D965B5D8@pexch112.icann.org>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1011,Hydra:6.0.650,FMLib:17.11.176.26 definitions=2024-04-28_16,2024-04-26_02,2023-05-22_02
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Q57nvoB6I88riENLXtnGHRgwjzg>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2024 22:18:29 -0000

On Apr 27, 2024, at 17:38, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Please review these drafts to see if you think they are suitable for adoption
> by DNSOP, and send any comments to the list, clearly stating your view.

The WG already has many important DNSSEC-related documents that are not getting enough attention from WG participants. Each of those documents would have much more significant effects on the security of the DNS than these proposed documents. The WG should not adopt these proposed documents until the more important documents have been standardized.

In the future, there may be more relevant attacks on SHA-1 and ECC-GOST, and adopting these documents would make sense then. The advances in practical attacks on SHA-1 have been slow and somewhat predictable. The use of ECC-GOST outside of regions where it was required is nearly non-existent.

The WG's attention is valuable, and spending that attention on documents that do not noticeably affect the actual security of the DNS is not a good use of our time. I propose that Wes keep the drafts alive as personal documents until the WG's DNSSEC documents with much more impact are finished.

--Paul Hoffman