Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC validator requirements

Petr Špaček <petr.spacek@nic.cz> Fri, 07 April 2017 11:25 UTC

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC validator requirements
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On 31.3.2017 05:48, Evan Hunt wrote:
> I have reviewed draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements-04.txt and
> some comments on the substance of it are below. (I'll also send some
> grammatical nitpicks via private mail.)
> 
>> However, without valid trust anchor(s) and an acceptable value for the
>> current time, DNSSEC validation cannot be performed.  This document lists
>> the requirements to be addressed so resolvers can have DNSSEC validation
>> can be always-on.
> 
> This abstract, and the introduction below, both seem to suggest that the
> intention of this draft is to list requirements for automatic bootstrapping
> and recovery of DNSSEC without human intervention.  However, several of the
> requirements actually included in the text describe mechanisms of human
> intervention: for example, insertion of negative trust anchors or the
> ability to flush the cache.
> 
> To my mind, any need for human intervention contradicts the idea of DNSSEC
> being "always-on"; humans can't react instantly.  So I suggest revising
> the abstract and the problem statement to say that these are requirements
> for a DNSSEC validator to be recovered when it fails, rather than for
> it always to be on.

A document listing what can possibly go wrong with DNSSEC deployment in
real world and what "features/tools" software vendors have to provide to
ease recovery is a good idea.

Having said that, I support Evan's view that here we are not talking
about "always-on" but more about "human intervention"/recovery. I think
that all other Evan's comments are good ideas as well and improve the
document.

I'm looking forward to reviewing a new version of the document.

-- 
Petr Špaček  @  CZ.NIC