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[DNSOP] Re: New draft on collision free key tags in DNSSEC

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Wed, 31 July 2024 17:18 UTC

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Subject: [DNSOP] Re: New draft on collision free key tags in DNSSEC
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On Jul 31, 2024, at 09:29, Petr Špaček <pspacek@isc.org> wrote:
> 
> On 30. 07. 24 9:41, libor.peltan wrote:
>> 2) I would still vote for allowing one keytag collision per zone (not per whole chain-of-trust, like Bind does) instead of none. This would be more comfortable for many older/simpler signers and not too much additional work for validating resolvers, IMHO.
> 
> Per-zone limit does not defend against resource exhaustion because an attacker can construct chain of delegations a.b.c.d.e...... and max out limit on each level. Then you instantly get about 126*(per-zone limit on validations) just for this particular attack vector.

Rate limit these at 10/sec ? Will allow random cases to work but will stop ddos.

> I agree with the angle that silent flag day has happened already. It's just undocumented (in form of RFC).

People can still fix their too harsh code 😜

> I agree with both of you. This is very small piece of the puzzle and IMHO not worth a standalone document - the overhead is too large.
> 
> I could see value in a document "here's list of ideas to think about if you are trying to defend against resource exhaustion" - in DNSSEC and DNS in general.

Yes

Paul

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