Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: draft-wkumari-dnsop-internal and DNAME

Petr Špaček <petr.spacek@nic.cz> Fri, 05 January 2018 11:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: draft-wkumari-dnsop-internal and DNAME
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On 12.11.2017 04:26, Joe Abley wrote:
> On Nov 12, 2017, at 10:51, Kim Davies <kim.davies@icann.org
> <mailto:kim.davies@icann.org>> wrote:
> 
> We haven't studied what would be involved, but I feel confident in
>> predicting the whole exercise would be non-trivial.
> 
> It seems to me that you could implement this using lawyers as easily as
> you could using developers; it is after all arguably a static change in
> procedure that doesn't need to be especially repeatable. If the root
> zone maintainer is contracted to include a record, surely the record
> will be included. 
> 
> However, I think the more general idea that queries for internal names
> should be leaked towards unknown AS112 operators is problematic. As an
> end-user I would prefer my leaked queries to be jealously hoarded by one
> of twelve root server operators than an inbound number of anonymous and
> potentially ephemeral AS112 operators.
> 
> The potential for complete data collection at the root servers goes down
> as resolvers implement aggressive NSEC caching. In the case of a

Unfortunatelly aggressive use of NSEC will not help because the name
will exist (either with NS or DNAME).

I wonder whether this is sufficient reason not to request the delegation
and let users to configure an exception for .internal (which is needed
anyway). This needs more thought.

Petr Špaček  @  CZ.NIC

> delegation or redirection, that potential is reduced since the
> non-existence of individual names under internal is then the thing that
> is cached, not the non-existence of the right-most label in the namespace.
> 
> 
> Joe