Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-serve-stale-03.txt

Christopher Morrow <> Tue, 05 March 2019 02:36 UTC

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From: Christopher Morrow <>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 21:36:09 -0500
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To: Paul Vixie <>
Cc: dnsop <>, Puneet Sood <>, Tim Wicinski <>, Paul Hoffman <>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-serve-stale-03.txt
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On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 9:26 PM Paul Vixie <> wrote:

> On Tuesday, 5 March 2019 02:21:42 UTC Christopher Morrow wrote:
> > can I ask, what happens when a domain is intentionally down though? For
> > instance, take .eg... ~4yrs back? (maybe 5?) Someone requested that the
> > master/shadow NS go down, hard. All public auth servers eventually (in a
> > day or so) went dark too.
> i already raised that question, very far up-thread. got no answer.
apologies for repeat-asking :( whoops! It'd still be good to hear an answer.
I can think of simple product and not 'life safety' reasons that I might
darken a zone as well, so if you don't want to answer for an abundance of
caution for your fellow folken... think of the product marketing folk who
mistakenly launch a day early, or who would like to retire a service in a
clearly delineated manner.


> If someone is 'ordered' to make a zone dark, there may be reasons for that
> > action, and real penalties if the request is not honored.
> > Is this draft suggesting that the DNS operations folk go against the
> wishes
> > of the domain owner by keeping a domain alive after the auth servers have
> > become unreachable? How would a recursive resolver know that the auth is
> > down: "By mistake" vs: "By design" ?
> this the essence of the argument against utility for this entire proposal.
> no
> data should be served beyond its TTL unless some new leasing protocol is
> first
> defined, to obtain permission and to provide a cache invalidation method.

this is what I was thinking as well. thanks for more clarity.