Re: [DNSOP]  Working Group Last Call draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming

Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org> Fri, 05 August 2016 09:45 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2016 11:45:11 +0200
From: Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org>
To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP]  Working Group Last Call draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming
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All,

At 2016-08-04 20:03:35 -0400
Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Remember the Resolver Priming draft? This thing has been kicking around 
> for a good solid 5 years. It stalled for a few years waiting for the 
> busy authors perform some updates.
> Then Paul Hoffman took the reins and has done a great job getting this 
> ready for publication.

w00t

I like this document, and am happy that it is moving again. :)
 
> This starts a Working Group Last Call  for draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming
> 
> Current versions of the draft is available here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming/
> 
> Please review the draft and offer relevant comments. Also, if someone 
> feels the document is *not* ready for publication, please speak out with 
> your reasons.

I have two minor comments, which may not require any changes.


First, we have:

  "If a priming query does not get a response within 2 seconds, the
  recursive resolver SHOULD retry with a different target address from
  the configuration."

The "2 seconds" seems a bit arbitrary. I'm not sure why any
recommendations need to be made at all. The document already says that
these are basically normal DNS queries elsewhere - surely that is enough? 
(And maybe if we do want to recommend a retry then we need to be clear
that if an answer comes from an earlier query that the resolver may
accept it?)


Second, a possible additional security consideration is that a priming
query typically signals a resolver starting with an empty cache
(although not always - the Knot resolver has a persistent cache, for
example). This may be an especially vulnerable time for a resolver for
cache poisoning. I don't know what can be done to mitigate this though
aside from requiring TCP or DNS cookies for a time after startup, so
perhaps this can be left out.

Cheers,

--
Shane