[DNSOP] Updating draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-01

Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org> Fri, 17 May 2019 02:18 UTC

Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 07:48:05 +0530
From: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20190517021805.GA28277@jurassic.lan.banu.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] Updating draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-01
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Hi everyone

Sometime ago, Jelte and I had submitted SHA-3 variants for existing
DNSSEC algorithms along with working code (for BIND and ldns
library). At that time, many of the reviewers felt that continuing to
include use of RSA signatures (though it was upgraded to the PSS form)
in new algorithms was redundant considering the migration to ECC
algorithms in the DNS industry. Though short-lived short-length RSA
signatures are still used in the DNS, the adoption of ECC algorithms has
been largely successful.

SHA-1 is getting weaker by the passing of time, and the SHA-2 family is
the last remaining deployed family of DNSSEC hash functions. It takes
time for new algorithms to trickle down into deployed software, and
introducing an alternative early is sensible.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-01

Please read the introduction section (page 3) for info on SHA-3 as it
compares to SHA-2.

Would there be consensus if the draft is updated to specify SHA-3 for
just a subset of ECC algorithms? Should it be specified for all of
[ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384, ED25519, ED448] or a subset of them?

		Mukund

[DNSOP] Updating draft-muks-dnsop-dnssec-sha3-01 Mukund Sivaraman