Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, 8 Apr 2022, Masataka Ohta wrote:

> First, "CA" is terminology not specific to WebPKI, whatever
> it means, but PKI in general including DNS. That is, a DNSSEC
> TLD is a CA.

This is incorrect. Or rather, it is equivalent to a CA with a
very strict path constraint of being within the TLD. In your
favourite terms, diginotar as DNSSEC entity would have only
been able to mess up .nl and not any other TLD, if it had been
a "DNSSEC CA" instead of a "webpki CA". The hierarchical space
offers better security than the flat webpki.

> Second "any CA which is weaker than some TLD" means not
> "cryptographically weaker" but "operationally/physically
> weaker". As such, your conclusion can only be "DNSSEC is
> more operationally/physically secure than WebPKI"

You keep conflating operational security with protocol security, and
insisting protocol security is not needed because operational security
is always the weaker link.

But you are not offering any alternative ("larger plaintext cookies"
is not a security protocol) and therefor imply we should abandon every
cryptographic protocol in the name of "false security".

So please tell me why you use TLS at all? Why not force your browser
into only using port 80? You can also use extra long HTTP header
cookies.

Paul