Re: [DNSOP] ALT-TLD and (insecure) delgations.

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> Fri, 10 February 2017 17:08 UTC

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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
To: dnsop@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] ALT-TLD and (insecure) delgations.
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On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 12:36:23PM -0800, Brian Dickson wrote:

> So, while technically the instruction (SHOULD NOT) applies to full .onion
> names,
> it is a SHOULD NOT, not a MUST NOT.

Note also that the original request was that it be a MUST NOT, and
some of us tried to explain that RFCs do not actually determine what
people may do and it's the Internet, and so you couldn't make a
requirement in one RFC that would be guaranteed to be implemented by
those who don't implement that RFC.  Which means that the restricton
is a stupid one.  The result was a compromise in which it says "SHOULD
NOT".  In this case, the pretty good reason not to implement the
restriction is that the Internet doesn't work the way the people who
wanted onion to work thought it did.

Any name under alt -- which is, rememeber, _supposed_ to be the
protocol switch in the way Warren and I originally were thinking --
should never get looked up in the global DNS.  If it does, that's
because someone is trying to use a name that contains right in itself
an indication that it needs an alternative resolution context, and not
having that resolution context available.  It might be that such a
computer will erroneously fall back on the global DNS.  That's not a
reason for us to do contortions in the specification.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com