Re: [DNSOP] [Doh] New I-D: draft-reid-doh-operator

Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> Sat, 16 March 2019 00:20 UTC

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Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 01:20:23 +0100 (CET)
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, DoH WG <doh@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Doh] New I-D: draft-reid-doh-operator
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> Il 15 marzo 2019 alle 19.36 Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>; ha scritto:
> 
>     As was pointed out in many groups, trusting the local infrastructure is extremely problematic in nomadic cases as the local infrastructure can often be infected, ill-maintained. or hostile by design.  Given the extremely high percentage of users who are now on the Internet by mobile devices which roam and opportunistically use WiFi, ignoring this reality would not make sense. 
> 
Does anyone have data on this "extremely high"? I am not challenging that the problem exists, though, in my experience of the last couple of years in Europe, the sudden availability of cheap Europe-wide mobile data plans means that people using the Internet from a smartphone tend to use random wi-fi networks less, and to stick to the network of their mobile operator when traveling (I would love to hear about other places).

In any case, what's problematic in that trade-off is the non sequitur that since "trusting the local infrastructure is extremely problematic in nomadic cases" then we design technical solutions that never trust the local infrastructure in any case - or even actively try to circumvent it.

This is just wrong, and does not consider that there are indeed many very common device use cases in which being nomadic is a rare exception (such as my mother's laptop) or does not happen at all (such as a desktop PC on a corporate network).

Perhaps letting the user bless the networks they trust would be a better approach.

Regards,

--

Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com mailto:vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com 
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