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Re: [DNSOP] rfc4641bis: NSEC vs NSEC3.

Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec> Tue, 23 February 2010 01:54 UTC

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From: Roy Arends <roy@dnss.ec>
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Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 20:55:53 -0500
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To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Cc: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>, dnsop@ietf.org, Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] rfc4641bis: NSEC vs NSEC3.
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On Feb 22, 2010, at 7:06 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:

> 
> In message <FD83B7A9-583C-4E6C-9301-414D043DBB08@dnss.ec>, Roy Arends writes:

>> This is absurd. If we're going to do this, I'd like the security consideratio
>> ns to reflect all of the non-zero probabilities of errors occuring (those tha
>> t have a higher probability). This includes software-bugs, hardware-bugs, pro
>> bability of advances in factorization, randomness of PRNG for DNSKEYs, faulty
>> calibration/low granularity of equipment measuring the transition between th
>> e two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium 133 atom. Gravitati
>> onal Sphere of Influence of the 99942 Apophis on the Gravitational orbit of G
>> PS satelites (Still having a higher probability than hash-collisions ;-)), Dr
>> unk Sysadmins, Rouge Registrar, etc, etc.
>> 
>> I'm sure that it will be a very large section.
> 
> Apart from the slightly higher risk of software bugs because NSEC3
> is more complicated.  The other items have no impact of the decision
> to choose between NSEC and NSEC3 and as such are irrelevent.

A slightly higher risk? Does a software bug probability of 1 count as a slightly higher risk?

Note that the security considerations section in 4641-bis has a much wider scope than NSEC vs NSEC3.

Roy

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