Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Wed, 13 February 2019 13:48 UTC

Return-Path: <stephane@sources.org>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A433712D861 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 05:48:09 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pmJesgkKRiPz for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 05:48:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ayla.bortzmeyer.org (ayla.bortzmeyer.org [IPv6:2001:4b98:dc0:41:216:3eff:fe27:3d3f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 481E112DDA3 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 05:48:08 -0800 (PST)
Received: by ayla.bortzmeyer.org (Postfix, from userid 10) id C34B8A06BF; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 14:48:06 +0100 (CET)
Received: by mail.sources.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id DD19E190673; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 14:44:08 +0100 (CET)
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 14:44:08 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: "zuopeng@cnnic.cn" <zuopeng@cnnic.cn>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20190213134408.ri5iy42q7u7h37ui@sources.org>
References: <2019021215560470371417@cnnic.cn> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1902120846480.18026@bofh.nohats.ca> <201902131403257357123@cnnic.cn>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <201902131403257357123@cnnic.cn>
X-Transport: UUCP rules
X-Operating-System: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6
X-Charlie: Je suis Charlie
User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/TyKJOsd14JgmlDumlTSIZNbPMYE>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 13:48:10 -0000

On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 02:03:26PM +0800,
 zuopeng@cnnic.cn <zuopeng@cnnic.cn>; wrote 
 a message of 103 lines which said:

> that's ture. but in my view, if the trust chain is built, we can
> ensure a resolver(or a cache) is always talking to a identified
> server and the channel is always secure, then the content could not
> be tampered.

Several emails already mentioned cases where it is not true (relaying
through a forwarder - transitive trust is hard - or secondary name
servers mnaged by a different organisation - a common use case).