From nobody Tue Jun 28 07:21:04 2022 Return-Path: X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40750C15CF49 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 07:21:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.104 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.104 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=umich.edu Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XVxY-0Gofrin for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 07:20:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-yw1-x1132.google.com (mail-yw1-x1132.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1132]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E1450C157B5C for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 07:20:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x1132.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-317710edb9dso119254707b3.0 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 07:20:59 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=umich.edu; s=google-2016-06-03; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=9+7ernEZsJB//CKOdffWqLnnttzLFkGGrHp7rd4weFA=; b=rerYVO733N5U9mFbG+ytcLcBgnRPPsZTSuCaiFW5lVPFL2cCvakiz5u6H48DX2tWhD bZ1+KJQbeSUbFKlwT2eFSUqOmUnopPnV3shGWAMTlmISRmiDGiTgFGgIGhJcPaFOmjSi b1lwKu4vsFegg4IkgQf+nme+E/TEt/Qcn9afbmwHEr5g3Dpp87chWcA9H72CeTrn0/eb Olv4W4a9maq357+rLWfG2yISxxPL0xtReDd/SLk18VYGbkEFfse2wIdRSE7lkaFsPFK1 sRPnuPL3uy0xyBzNVYoT9+SolxLEvu9qQl83tzcaC2pS+qPhA2mOy9lTeCOPuDRbwDSh mt2Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=9+7ernEZsJB//CKOdffWqLnnttzLFkGGrHp7rd4weFA=; b=Cj1vL84BNRnesS35FCgcGNQfPNdzWCxlKCYmMujKgLR3Q76ILAjnTyrIS9PAJSD0QU lWPt09OsI2hWt4ZhfTWQXAHQ9r/4ML8AZ6Zem4PMukV3PEIkGulbeR8IMaUgnx8C7Bud yACMuzquTcAwqyhCkZXLDsdCwkzWCmvkb5+YWE4YF4G67s/lT9P6AfZ39zHlQLGMQK2J XmU+2+XFyV90xpTZG2n7+DNB+nLaOC+JAk3yBy56rYf/4Ik1OjdUU31BOblv7+muzdll cdB64Vw37EIjhyt5VhYvwAQYZHu8IsBiHDfsPsnPJBuyffnWXBVSy1PIp/xJVNdswihZ 0iXg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9jod2LSbgOuUyjrjvCdDDwfkSCZiqyROmFxhU7F2HOD8AS0yOM 4zPcVJXD+ZIp2y+kMpHpMzvNBTxEXtiE4pAtqyZznrS3iE4= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1vvOxG5zMMoJPlaY/yiMiGQsBwzBqn26FnkkGsDWIHQjRX00O6HiHEsV/xc1R//CY2sQVIL1hnT8f1XAgSnHs4= X-Received: by 2002:a81:1406:0:b0:317:9cca:6fe6 with SMTP id 6-20020a811406000000b003179cca6fe6mr21676631ywu.287.1656426058207; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 07:20:58 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <9cc0c19f-da83-72ae-a940-16f1662bf29@nohats.ca> <0e230058-080a-dd30-8808-f66eb9a1dc47@desec.io> In-Reply-To: <0e230058-080a-dd30-8808-f66eb9a1dc47@desec.io> From: Bob Harold Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 10:20:47 -0400 Message-ID: To: Peter Thomassen Cc: Paul Wouters , "dnsop@ietf.org WG" Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000cbe60405e282be86" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Updating RFC 7344 for cross-NS consistency X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39 Precedence: list List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:21:04 -0000 --000000000000cbe60405e282be86 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 9:52 AM Peter Thomassen wrote: > > > On 6/28/22 02:56, Paul Wouters wrote: > >> I thus propose to update RFC 7344 along the lines of (2), such that it > is REQUIRED to retrieve CDS/CDNSKEY records using queries to all > authoritative nameservers. > > > > The question is now how to phrase this exactly. Do we want the parent to > use > > its "external" knowledge of NS records of the child - eg from its WHOIS > data? > > That would be clean and simple. > > > > Or are we okay that it queries for the NS records to get the list ? > > If so, it would need to require DNSSEC for the NS RRset, but there might > > be more than one validly signed NS RRset if these nameservers are out > > of sync. In that case, which of these is the intended one? > > The parental agent has unerring knowledge of the delegation NS records, so > I think those should be used. This is also what's done for bootstrapping, > where the child-side NS RRset is not yet trusted. > > For the reason you mentioned and for consistency with bootstrapping, I'd > suggest to choose phrasing that similar to that in the bootstrapping draft, > such as (inspired by in draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping, Section 3.2): > > Query the CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex directlyfrom > each of the authoritative servers as determined by thedelegation's > NS record set using a trusted DNSresolver and enforce DNSSEC > validation > > or (inspired by bootstrapping Section 3.3): > > The Parental Agent MUST ascertain that queries are only made against > the proper set of nameservers as listed in the Child's delegation > from the Parent. > > Having this aligned allows CDS/CDNSKEY scanners to use the same query > logic for bootstrapping and for rollovers. > > >> Does the WG think this is a reasonable thing to pursue? > > > > I think this could be an excellent super short RFC that Updates: 7344. > > Sure, I'm volunteering to write up something. I'll wait until Thursday or > so, in case others share thoughts I should know before I start. > > Thanks, > Peter > > -- > https://desec.io/ > > But the parent NS set is not covered by DNSSEC, and thus could be spoofed?? (Wish we could fix that!) -- Bob Harold --000000000000cbe60405e282be86 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Tue, Jun 28, 2= 022 at 9:52 AM Peter Thomassen <peter@= desec.io> wrote:


On 6/28/22 02:56, Paul Wouters wrote:
>> I thus propose to update RFC 7344 along the lines of (2), such tha= t it is REQUIRED to retrieve CDS/CDNSKEY records using queries to all autho= ritative nameservers.
>
> The question is now how to phrase this exactly. Do we want the parent = to use
> its "external" knowledge of NS records of the child - eg fro= m its WHOIS data?
> That would be clean and simple.
>
> Or are we okay that it queries for the NS records to get the list ? > If so, it would need to require DNSSEC for the NS RRset, but there mig= ht
> be more than one validly signed NS RRset if these nameservers are out<= br> > of sync. In that case, which of these is the intended one?

The parental agent has unerring knowledge of the delegation NS records, so = I think those should be used. This is also what's done for bootstrappin= g, where the child-side NS RRset is not yet trusted.

For the reason you mentioned and for consistency with bootstrapping, I'= d suggest to choose phrasing that similar to that in the bootstrapping draf= t, such as (inspired by in draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-bootstrapping, Section 3= .2):

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Query the CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex directly= from
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 each of the authoritative servers as determined by thedelegat= ion's
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 NS record set using a trusted DNSresolver and enforce DNSSEC<= br> =C2=A0 =C2=A0 validation

or (inspired by bootstrapping Section 3.3):

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 The Parental Agent MUST ascertain that queries are only made = against
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 the proper set of nameservers as listed in the Child's de= legation
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 from the Parent.

Having this aligned allows CDS/CDNSKEY scanners to use the same query logic= for bootstrapping and for rollovers.

>> Does the WG think this is a reasonable thing to pursue?
>
> I think this could be an excellent super short RFC that Updates: 7344.=

Sure, I'm volunteering to write up something. I'll wait until Thurs= day or so, in case others share thoughts I should know before I start.

Thanks,
Peter

--
https://= desec.io/


But the parent NS set= is not covered by DNSSEC, and thus could be spoofed??=C2=A0 =C2=A0
(Wish we could fix that!)

--=C2=A0
Bo= b Harold
=C2=A0
--000000000000cbe60405e282be86--