Re: [DNSOP] FYI: draft-andrews-dnsop-defeat-frag-attack

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Wed, 10 July 2019 21:12 UTC

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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2019 07:12:29 +1000
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To: Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] FYI: draft-andrews-dnsop-defeat-frag-attack
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AAAA is the base64 encoding of 3 zero octet.  If named was using a hex encoding it would be 000000. 

-- 
Mark Andrews

> On 11 Jul 2019, at 06:45, Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 2:21 AM Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
>> I’ve written up a method to defeat UDP fragmentation attacks using TSIG.
>> 
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-andrews-dnsop-defeat-frag-attack-00
>> 
>> If we are going to discuss methods to defeat such attacks this should be
>> considered.
>> 
>> -- 
>> Mark Andrews, ISC
> 
>  Looks like a useful workaround.
> 
> 2. The Well Known Key
> 
> The well known key has a owner name of "." and uses HMAC-SHA256
> [RFC4635] as its algorithm with a key of 256 zero bits.
> 
> -- but later:
> 
> A.1. BIND 9
> 
> Add the following to named.conf. Some end-of-life versions do not
> support HMAC-SHA256.
> 
> key "." {
> algorithm hmac-sha256;
> secret "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
> };
> 
> -- Does a key of 256 zeros translate to a string of "A" characters?  I am not an expert on HMAC-SHA256.
> 
> -- 
> Bob Harold