Re: [DNSOP] Measuring DNS TTL clamping in the wild

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Tue, 05 December 2017 16:46 UTC

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Date: Tue, 05 Dec 2017 17:46:49 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com>
Cc: Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Ólafur Guðmundsson <olafur@cloudflare.com>, dnsop <DNSOP@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Measuring DNS TTL clamping in the wild
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On Fri, Dec 01, 2017 at 01:12:34PM -0500,
 Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> wrote 
 a message of 41 lines which said:

> Shortening TTLs increases the amount of traffic between the recursive resolvers and authoritative resolvers and lengthens the response time for some queries.  However, I don’t think there is any service guarantee with respect to an individual query that is violated by shortening the TTL.
> 
> Lengthening a TTL, on the other hand, does change one of the service guarantees.  When there is a change in the entry in the authoritative server, what is the maximum time until that change is guaranteed to be propagated throughout the net?  This depends primarily on the TTL.  However, when the TTL is lengthened by the recursive resolvers, the upper bound for propagation of a change is similarly increased.

I fully agree about this very important difference (which is
completely missing in the RIPE Labs article). Lengthening the
TTL is a protocol violation (otherwise, we wouldn't discuss about
draft-ietf-dnsop-serve-stale). Shortening it systematically is bad
manners, and is selfish but is not a protocol violation.

We should not discuss the two in the same thread: they are very
different practices.